http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/04/AR2007100401357.html
bestsellers imaginable. The cover of "The Children of Moses," the first and most
popular book in a series of four, shows the country's devoutly Muslim prime
minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in the middle of a six-pointed Star of David.
Inside, you'll find a head-spinningly weird argument: that Erdogan and his
conservative allies in Turkey's ruling pro-Islamic party are actually crypto-Jews
with secret wicked ties to the conspiratorial forces of "global Zionism."
The books are hardly a fringe phenomenon. They're arrayed in chic bookstores
along Istiklal Avenue, the funky pedestrian mall that's the heart of secular
Istanbul. They're openly displayed alongside Orhan Pamuk novels at Ataturk
International Airport. And they're even sold on tiny bookstands on the Princes'
Islands, the vacation destinations in the Sea of Marmara that many well-off
Turks view the way Manhattanites do the Hamptons. By the publishers' figures,
they've sold about 520,000 copies since the books started rolling out this year
-- a staggering figure for a nation of about 71 million people.
imagination. "International Jewry" has been blamed for destroying both czarist
Russia and the Soviet Union, for cooking up both capitalism and communism.
state? That's a new one.
In fact, the politicians from the ruling Justice and Development Party (known by
its Turkish acronym AKP) whom the books accuse of being Israeli stooges have
strong Islamic identities. The cover of the first volume shows not only Erdogan
in the middle of the six-pointed star, but also his wife, Emine, who is famous
in Turkey for wearing a traditionalist Islamic headscarf -- perhaps the world's
least likely crypto-Zionist conspirator.
Ergun Poyraz, who wrote the series, is a self-declared "Kemalist," the term used
here to describe the committed followers of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the
resolutely secular war hero who founded modern Turkey in 1923. The politicians
whom Poyraz is out to skewer define themselves as sensible conservatives, but
they're derided as closet fundamentalists by their foes among Turkey's
traditional elites, who are still deeply suspicious of any intrusion of Islam
into the public sphere. Poyraz's books argue -- apparently in all seriousness --
that "Zionism" has decided to steer Turkey away from its time-worn secular path
and turn it into a "moderate Islamic republic." It is hard to believe that
"Zionism" (let alone any sane Israeli leader) would prefer an Islamist Turkey to
a secular one, but Poyraz is convinced that a mildly Islamic state would be more
easily manipulated by foreign powers than a staunchly nationalist one.
Poyraz doesn't present evidence to support his bewildering claims, which aren't
documented, footnoted or backed up with any credible facts. His method
throughout is to cherry-pick irrelevant data, then build wild speculation on
them. The series is among the most creative sequels to "The Protocols of the
Elders of Zion," the anti-Semitic classic propagated by the czarist secret
service a century ago. So why are these lunatic books bestsellers, featured in
the windows of virtually every grand bookstore in Turkey? And why are the
supposedly open-minded secularists, not the alleged Islamists, the ones peddling
anti-Semitism?
The answer, oddly enough, is connected to the anti-Europe sentiment that has
exploded here in recent years. Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has
accelerated Turkey's bid to join the European Union. Some Europeans aren't keen
to let a Muslim democracy join their Christian club, but E.U. membership has
proved widely popular in Turkey. In turn, that has encouraged Turkey's
xenophobic and anti-democratic forces -- who fear that European liberties would
be dangerous and corrupting -- to crawl out of the woodwork. Opponents of the
E.U. bid insist that the Turkish Republic faces grave threats from enemies
within and without, and warn that the only way to save the country is to keep it
illiberal and closed.
What is most striking in this nationwide division is that the so-called
Islamists are generally on the liberal pro-Western side, while the secularists
are often on the other. In the general election held on July 22, the "Islamist"
AKP had the most strongly pro-E.U. platform, whereas the ultra-secularist
Republican People's Party tried to woo voters with Euro-skeptic rhetoric. (The
AKP won the elections with a clear victory of 47 percent, while its main secular
rival took 21 percent.) The AKP is also a strong proponent of free markets and
foreign investment, whereas most secularist politicians see such things as
"imperialist" and favor a state-protected economy. As Ziya Onis, a political
economist at Koc University in Istanbul, said recently, the current power
struggle in Turkey is between "conservative globalists" and "defensive
nationalists" -- including the ultra-secular Kemalists.
In this context, the mystifying bestsellers make more sense: as a smear campaign
cheered on by Turkey's spooked secularists, who hope that vilifying the AKP
leadership as Jewish agents will help scare away the party's supporters, thereby
staving off E.U. membership and limiting Turkey's exposure to corrosive European
ideas.
The books' odd fusion of anti-Semitism and Kemalism also has a historical
pedigree. When Ataturk raised modern Turkey from the ruins of the Ottoman
Empire, he wisely decided to orient it toward the West. But during his time in
power (1923-38), the West included not only democracies such as the United
States and Britain but dictatorships such as fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.
Ataturk never admired these tyrannies, but some of his aides and followers
certainly did, and they incorporated numerous fascist elements into Turkey's
state-sponsored brand of secular nationalism. Fantasies about the supremacy of
the Turkish race soon became official rhetoric. Turkey adopted corporatism,
Benito Mussolini's state-dominated economic model, and when Ataturk died, he was
declared the country's "eternal chief." His successor, Mustafa Ismet Inonu,
introduced a heavy "wealth tax" in 1942 that specifically targeted Jews. Unable
to pay, many were sent to labor camps in eastern Turkey.
This dark episode of Turkish history ended after the Allies' victory in World
War II, which forced the Kemalist elite to shift from single-party rule to
democracy. But unlike other European nations, Turkey never engaged in much
self-criticism of its interwar chauvinism -- which let ultra-nationalist themes
persist as legitimate ideas. When the E.U. admission process pushed Turkey to
liberalize itself, these skeletons came out of the closet.
Last February, the country was shocked by the exposure of a fascist gang called
the Union of Patriotic Forces, led by Fikri Karadag, a retired colonel. The
group's secret oath included the words, "I am of pure Turkish stock, and there
is no Jewish convert in my blood," as well as a promise to "kill and to be
killed" for the sake of "making the Turkish nation the lord of the world."
In June, police found 27 hand grenades and stacks of TNT in an Istanbul house
belonging to another fascist gang with shadowy links to the country's security
forces. The bust led the authorities to other cells, and Poyraz, the prolific
anti-Semitic author, was among their members. After his arrest, the lawyer who
rushed to defend him was none other than Kemal Kerincsiz, who has lately made a
name for himself by suing dozens of liberal intellectuals -- including the Nobel
Prize-winning Pamuk -- for "insulting Turkishness."
The trial of Poyraz and his comrades goes on. So does Turkey's own trial by
radical nationalism. Many in Washington are concerned about what President Bush
calls "Islamofascism." But that term too easily misleads us into assuming that
there's a direct link between Islam and fascism. In fact, xenophobia and
authoritarianism have their own complex roots in the societies where they thrive
and may be mingled with almost any sort of religion or irreligion. In Turkey,
they are becoming less linked with Islam and more with secularism.
Mustafa Akyol is deputy editor of the Turkish Daily News.
by Naamah Paley
When reading the array of travel guide books about Turkey at any given American bookstore, the inevitable phrase always surfaces on the introductory pages: “Turkey, a country where East meets West.” Turkey, due to its historically strategic location placed between the Middle East and Europe, plays a crucial role in the region, particularly in the shaping and growth of Israel. The Turks have many options as members of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as both religious Muslims and members of a secular democracy, and as participants in the Organization of Islamic Countries as well as a contender for membership in the European Union. Turkey can easily ally with numerous sides, aided by the variety of coalitions it has aligned with.
Zvi Elpeleg, Israel’s ambassador to Turkey, once said that without Turkey, Israel was like “a leaf in the wind.”1 This relationship is a result of the two nations being “the only two pluralistic democracies in the region.”2 The foundations of modern Turkey trace back to Kemal Atatürk,“Father of the Turks,” who declared secularism, Westernism, and democracy to be the three pillars of modern Turkey. Shifting Turkey into a “non-Muslim” and “Western” mindset has allowed it to become an ally of both Israel and the United States while remaining a member of the Muslim World.3
As Turkey’s importance to the formation of the Greater Middle East, with Israel as a central issue, increases, Turkey has experienced a deepening split. A “state-versus-society fault line”4 has been caused by a rise of Islam in both the Turkish government and society, resulting in changed Turkish relationships with traditional allies: Israel and the United States. As the region becomes more polarized, particularly due to the war in Iraq, Turkey will continue to distance itself.
Turkey’s Historical Role and Relations
The Turkish role in Israel is traced back to the Ottoman conquest of Jerusalem by Selim I in 1517. The Ottomans are historically known for their relatively kind treatment of Jews and for their peaceful rule of Jerusalem.5 Ofra Bengio writes that, for Jews, “the legacy of the Ottoman Empire’s acceptance of Jews laid the basis for future Turkish acceptance of Israel.”6 For Muslim leaders, Ottoman control of Jerusalem, which permitted Muslim access to the Holy City, remains symbolic. According to Hamas leader Halil Mes’ad, “We expect much from Turkey with its political and military leverage and Islamic potential. Turkey has a historical responsibility for the region and us.”7
Jerusalem holds the third holiest site in Islam, the highly contested Dome of the Rock inside the Al-Aqsa Mosque. This was the site of the Isra and Mi’raj, the two-part nocturnal journey of the Prophet Muhammad during which he rose to the Gate between this world and the hereafter.8 Due to the location of this holy site, Bülent Aras writes that for the majority Muslim population of Turkey, “the status of Jerusalem is the number one problem in the Middle East in terms of Turkish public opinion.”9 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak invoked Turkish political power, “the Jerusalem causes belong not only to Arabs but to all Islamic countries and especially to the Turks.”10 Turkish responsibility to Muslims in regards to Israel remains strong and clear.
Recognition: Turkey as an Ally of Modern Israel
Although formal Turkish diplomatic relations with Israel did not begin until after the conclusion of the Cold War, early support traces back to the very origins of the modern state of Israel. Turkey’s delicate role in the region began with its response to the Israeli Declaration of Statehood in 1948. After initial setbacks, Turkey was both the first Muslim country and the last European country to recognize the State of Israel.11 This decision resulted in an immediate deterioration in Turkish-Arab relations: the Muslim Brotherhood newspaper Al-dawa labeled Turkey a second Israel, for example, and called for its destruction.12 As a Muslim country, Turkey was unable to ignore this criticism and while some viewed Israel as a valuable and strategic country to recognize, others began to respond negatively to the newly developed policy. Early partnership between the Turks and the Israelis did occur, but the partnership was kept secret and ambiguous, in order to avoid manifesting negative reactions from within Turkey and the Arab World.
The relationship was beneficial to Israel from its conception. In 1958, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion believed in breaking the “ring of isolation”13 that Arab countries had imposed on Israel by forming an alliance with countries of the periphery, which included Turkey. Ben-Gurion called on United States President Eisenhower to support his diplomatic endeavor, and received an affirmative response. Israel was a strategic element for the Americans who, in the aftermath of the Second World War and at the start of the Cold War, were looking to increase their influence in the region.
A series of secret meetings laid the foundations for a later Turkish-Israeli alliance. The Turks kept this agreement particularly quiet due to their participation in the 1955 Baghdad Pact —a strategic alliance between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan— in the hopes that they would not publicly isolate these Muslim countries with their new relationship with Israel and the United States.
In light of these conflicting agreements, “Turkey had become ‘Israel’s eyes’ into the Arab world.”14
A Shift in American Policy: The Triple Alliance
Following increased American influence in the region at the start of the Gulf War, a closer relationship developed between the Turks and the Israelis. The Gulf War was viewed as the unofficial end of the Cold War and marked the destruction of the Soviet Union. This, in turn, created a vacuum of influence, which was quickly filled by rising American hegemony over the region. Turkey had long remained neutral in the Middle East due to Soviet threats. However, with the victory of the United States in the Cold War, and with Israel having gained greater legitimacy in the international arena, Turkey was able to make qualitative progress in its relationship with Israel.15 In a decision to align with the West, Turkey soon closed the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline.16
To maintain relations with the Arab world, Turkey did not initiate formal relations with Israel until after the 1993 Madrid Conference, which held diplomatic talks between Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians. Turkey and Israel then committed to a 1993 Memorandum of Understanding, which led to the creation of an alliance. The two agreed to “cooperate in gathering intelligence on Syria, Iran, and Iraq and to meet regularly to share assessments pertaining to terrorism and these countries’ military capabilities.”17 This strategic alliance meant that the Turks would allow the Israeli Army to gather intelligence from within Turkey and, in exchange, the Israelis would assist training and equipping the Turkish forces in anti-terror warfare along their dangerous borders. In order to prevent backlash to Turkish foreign policy from the Turkish population itself and other Arab countries, it was crucial that the Turkish government wait for other Muslim countries to initiate diplomacy with Israel before further publicizing their own relationship.
The Turkish-Israeli alliance has flourished under the auspices of their third and often secret member, the United States. The origins of this United States supported alliance resulted from a shift in United States policy from introducing democracy to promoting already existing democracies following the Cold War.18 Israel and Turkey were both prime candidates for this policy; rare secular democracies in a region of theocratic governments. Turkey, for the United States, is an example of “democracy as a ‘risk’ in Muslim countries in the face of ‘popularity’ of Islamist leaders.” The United States encouraged these two democracies to collaborate on their efforts, and the alliance proved mutually beneficial.
Israeli politicians realized that a military alliance with Turkey would strengthen Israel’s hands in negotiations with the Palestinians and Syria, and would pave way for a beneficial Turkish-Israeli hegemony in Middle East.19 Agreements within this alliance have since included bi-annual high-level consultations, a Free Trade Agreement, the Ceyhan-Ashkelon oil pipeline project, a water pipeline channeling Turkish water to Israel, and various Istanbul based cooperatives.20
Daniel Kurtzer, the former American Ambassador to Israel, publicly declared that, “the triangular relationship among our three countries is of utmost strategic importance.”21
Close military ties between the members of the Washington-Ankara-Tel-Aviv Axis, were created and encouraged under then President Clinton. In November of 1995, Clinton, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and Jordan’s King Hussein collaborated to articulate a new strategic concept of the Middle East based on a secular ideal. This new vision for the Middle East, according to the Arabs, meant that Turkey would serve as a regional policeman22 and according to the West, that Turkey could play a significant role as a channel of communication between the region and the West.23 With this new alliance, Turkey appeared to have abandoned its traditional policy of balancing Arabs against Israel. This would further create a basis for later criticism from the Arab World and internal Turkish critics of secularism.
Partners in the War on Terror
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, Turkey was the first nation to offer troops to the United States. Since Turkey and Israel have both suffered from domestic terrorism, Israel with the Palestinians and Turkey with the Kurds, both countries were natural supporters for President George W. Bush’s war on terror. The Turks have long struggled with the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), the Kurdistan Workers Party, an armed militant group whose aim is to create an independent Kurdistan, part of which would exist in Southeastern Turkey. The group has caused over 37,000 Turkish deaths.24 Israel and its military efforts have led the war on terror, a version of which they have been fighting since the very conception of the state. Some have drawn parallels between the PKK and Palestinian militant groups—in terms of their terrorist tactics and goal of independent statehood—which has led to support and cooperation between the two countries. This parallel has frequently caused Israel, as well as the influential American Jewish lobby, to defend the Turkish actions against both the Armenians and the Kurds. It is even believed by that Israeli intelligence assisted the Turks in capturing Abdullah Öcalan, a leader of the PKK.25
Turkey’s membership in NATO has assisted both Israel and the United States in gaining further support for the war on terror. Following NATO’s Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the NATO Secretary General spoke in Tel-Aviv announcing that NATO would like to “move from dialogue to partnership [with Israel]” in the “critical fight against terrorism.”26 Allying with NATO indirectly strengthens Israel’s military alliance with Turkey against regional enemies, such as Syria and Iran. The later Istanbul Cooperation Initiative attempted to neutralize Israel’s potential adversaries in the Arab World by, to some degree paralyzing the Arab states at the diplomatic and military levels. These numerous efforts united the three partners in collaborating to fight terrorism and showed further isolation of Turkish foreign policy from sectors of the Turkish population and the Arab World. As Turkey continued to practice balancing its Muslim identity with its secular ideals, American anti-terror tactics would soon increasingly manifest a division between the Turkish government and the populace.
A Deteriorating Relationship: The War in Iraq
The controversial war in Iraq widened the gap between the separate Muslim and secular identities of the Turkish people and government. Prior to the war in Iraq, the American Ambassador to Turkey, Robert Pearson, commended Turkey’s “positive accomplishment in countering terror. The United States can have no better ally in countering terrorism because of Turkey’s achievements in countering terror.”27 However, on the brink of war in March 2003, Turkey’s Parliament failed to approve a motion that would have permitted the deployment of American forces throughout Turkey to create a northern front against Iraq.28 This decision and a general lack of support for the war created a rift that caused Turkey to align with much of the European Union and Arab countries rather than Israel, an advocate of the war, and the United States. Although Israel and Turkey would both benefit from a democracy in Iraq, the Turks feared the emergence of an independent Kurdish state from an Iraqi democracy.
The United States and Israel, both of whom fought on behalf of the Kurds in the first Gulf War, see the Kurdish leaders as their only allies in Iraq that could contribute to a democratic government. For the Turks, however, the Iraq War threatened a Pandora’s Box, since a Kurdistan in northern Iraq would be a bastion for PKK terrorist activity.29 Israel and Turkey became divided over the Kurds: “Turkey desires a strong central government in Baghdad in order to check Kurdish nationalism, while Israel hopes that the Kurds carve a niche for themselves against Baghdad to ensure that this new Iraq is a decentralized, weak, and non-threatening Arab state.”30 While all Turks are critical of the Kurds and have experienced Kurdish terrorism, responses at this stage led to a split within the Turkish government. This war marked a clash in policy both within Turkey and between the members of the Triple Alliance: promoting democracy, fighting terrorism, and remaining loyal to each nation’s population became conflicting agendas.
A Turkish Response: Islamization and Division
In April of 2004, the Islamist Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) or, Justice and Development Party, rose to power in Turkey. Turkish public opinion became increasingly anti-American as a result of the war in Iraq, and most Turks began to identify with “Islamist issues.” Religious domestic policies have begun to shape, like issuing an official standard designating halal foods and attempts to legalize the Muslim headscarf in public institutions. These attempts, led by the AKP with the support of much of the Turkish public, have crafted the “state-versus-society fault line”: both within the government and in the larger country. General Mehmet Yaşar Büyükanıt, Turkey’s new Chief of Staff, has been a vocal advocate of secularism against the rising “reactionaryism,” the Turkish shorthand for Islamic fundamentalism.31 The AKP had exercised unchecked executive power until the election of Büyükanıt and Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, both of whom oppose AKP reactionaryism and serve, in the Turkish government, as the military and high courts. While the AKP, with the support of many Turks, invited Hamas representatives to Ankara in April, 2006, Büyükanıt and Sezer have both denounced Hamas as a terrorist organization and refuse to acknowledge them. Further, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan recently agreed to a unilateral ceasefire with the PKK, which Büyükanıt denounced, asserting that the struggle against the PKK “would continue until the group was entirely defeated.”32
The war in Iraq, and the response of the Turkish government, has led to an increased alliance between Turkey and the European Union, both critics of a war without the support of the United Nations. The AKP, which is more critical of Israel than past ruling parties, focused on Israel’s recognition of the Iraqi Kurds in the American waged war in Iraq and encouraged both secular and religious Turks to isolate Israel. Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote that in the wake of the war, “the AKP is also alienating Turkey’s other traditional ally in the region, Israel.”33 This new position has encouraged Turkey to align with the European Union, as perhaps a replacement for its current alliance with Israel and the United States.
The Private and the Public: A Response to Lebanon
Just as the war in Iraq threatened the American-Turkish relationship, the July-August 2006 Conflict between the Israeli government and the Lebanese militant group Hizbullah, has even further heightened tensions within the Turkish-Israel alliance. On July 6th, 2006, barely a week before the start of the conflict, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul visited Washington to discuss a “Shared Vision” of Turkey and the United States, which can be “characterized by strong bonds of friendship, alliance, mutual trust and unity of vision.” Gul declared that, “Ankara wants to be a part of the political process of the Middle East.”34 The Triple Alliance became severely endangered on July 12th, with Israeli movement into Lebanon. In the days following Israel’s bombing of the Beirut International Airport, 100,000 flocked to an anti-Israel rally in Istanbul.
The recent Islamization of Turkey, headed by the AKP, resulted in greater Turkish support for Hezbollah. As the AKP continues to encourage the Turkish public to support a desecularization of their country, it encourages the Turks to identify with the external Muslim world. “If Turks think of themselves as Muslims first in the foreign policy arena,” the AKP believes, “then one day they’ll think of themselves as Muslims first in the domestic one.”35 At the August Organization of the Islamic Conference in Kuala Lumpur, Erdoğan stated, “This war is unjust… The Israeli war…is simply fueling hatred… It is not difficult to see that a terrible global war and a huge disaster awaits us.”36 Yigal Schleifer, a writer for The Jerusalem Report, described a sign in the window of tourist store in the seaside resort town of Alanya, “For children killers Israelis no sale no entry.” The growing de-secularization of Turkish public opinion has resulted in a decline in Israeli tourism and business investments in Turkey. Schleifer still believes that Turkey’s Executive branch and political establishment remain committed to maintaining relationship, quoting a Turkish university professor, “They see the relationship as an asset, not a liability.”37 While many Israelis remain hopeful for this relationship and believe that Turkey will continue to stand by Israel, the growing “reactionayrism” has begun to raise doubts.
In early October, Erdoğan’s government, with the full support of the AKP, finally committed Turkish troops to the Lebanese peacekeeping efforts, making Turkey the first Muslim nation to do so. A Ha’aretz article suggested that “Erdoğan’s government sees participating in the Lebanon peacekeeping force as a chance to raise Turkey’s international profile as it strives to join the European Union and reassert Turkish influence in the region.”38 The secular Turkish military troops will only assist with humanitarian aid as Erdoğan promised that, “Turkey would neither disarm nor harm Hezbollah.”39 This decision will allow Turkey to maintain and reassert an active role in the conflict, as guaranteed by the “Shared Vision” Pact, but with increased, and possibly dangerous, complications.
Conclusion
The source of Turkey’s relationship with Israel and the United States has its roots in secularism. Turkey has long chosen secularism and a strong economy as a means to ally with the United States and the West, and fought its current shift towards becoming a religious Muslim state. Israel is able to ally with the Turks but continues to fight with the Palestinians, Syrians, Iranians and others who have chosen an “Islamism” that Israel will not reconcile with. However, the situation has changed partly due to events in Iraq and Lebanon; the Turkish population now favors Iran more than the United States. Today for every Turk who likes the United States, there are three Turks who like Iran.40 Turkey’s increased sensitivities to its Muslim population, emphasized through the growing power of the AKP, has threatened the continuance of the Triple Alliance.
Alon Liel, a member of the Israeli diplomatic corps to Turkey once declared in reference to the relationship between the two countries that, “we can love each other but we don’t have to kiss and hug in public.”41 Turkey, to some degree, has the power to carve a niche for Israel in the Middle East, causing the United States to realize that Turkey is a key ally to have in the region. The Turks are rare in that they are respected because of their Muslim population and because they also possess the tools to communicate and means to negotiate with the West. Within the Turkish government, there has been a rise in “reactionaryism” as the historic enforcement of Kemalism has begun to decline. Although leaders like Büyükanıt and President Sezet remain committed to secularism, “the AKP government might well turn Turkey into an unrecognizable country—somehow democratic, superficially secular, and definitely not Western.”42 As the situation remains unstable and the fault line deepens with the recent conflict in Lebanon and the continuing war in Iraq, this alliance has the potential to either thrive or unravel.
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